Balancing the Equities:  Considering the  Flip Side  of the UBIT and Forming a Workable Solution by Condliffe, Kalle
Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 8
2011
Balancing the Equities: Considering the "Flip Side"
of the UBIT and Forming a Workable Solution
Kalle Condliffe
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Kalle Condliffe, Balancing the Equities: Considering the "Flip Side" of the UBIT and Forming a Workable Solution, 6 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. &
Com. L. (2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol6/iss1/8
BALANCING THE EQUITIES: CONSIDERING 
THE “FLIP-SIDE” OF THE UBIT AND 
FORMING A WORKABLE SOLUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Professors Anup Malani and Eric Posner published a 
controversial article, which argued that tax benefits currently available to 
nonprofit organizations should be extended to for-profit companies doing 
charitable work.1 They based their argument on the assumption that 
nonprofit tax benefits were created to encourage and reward “community-
benefit” work, and not the choice to refrain from distributing profits.2 They 
argued that conditioning tax benefits on the work of the organization, 
irrespective of its chosen corporate form, would incentivize for-profit firms 
to produce public goods.3 According to Malani and Posner, this approach is 
important because for-profit firms will produce these goods more efficiently 
than their nonprofit counterparts.4 
Although the extension of tax benefits would likely increase the overall 
production of public goods,5 there are a number of ways in which the 
implementation of Malani and Posner’s proposal would degrade the 
charitable sector. Consequently, this proposal has received a great deal of 
criticism.6 Most critiques reflect the concern that an extension of 501(c)(3)7 
tax benefits to for-profit organizations would severely diminish the utility 
of the “nondistribution constraint,”8 which arguably does most of the work 
in distinguishing charitable organizations.9 
The most common attacks on this proposal include (1) without the 
“nondistribution constraint,” determining which organizations should be 
eligible for tax benefits would be administratively untenable;10 (2) without 
the “nondistribution constraint,” the government would be forced to define 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2023 
(2007). “The issue we raise is the flip side of the UBIT debate: should for-profit firms be taxed 
like nonprofit firms (or more precisely, be exempt from taxes like nonprofit firms) when they 
engage in charitable activities? Our answer is yes, because there is no reason to condition the tax 
subsidy for charitable activities on organizational form.” Id.  
 2. Id. at 2029.  
 3. Id. at 2022.  
 4. Id. at 2022, 2055.  
 5. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Essay, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 
2464 (2009). 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 12–16.  
 7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 8. The “nondistribution constraint” is a term coined by Henry Hansmann to describe the 
prohibition on the distribution of profits generated by nonprofit organizations. Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) [hereinafter The Role 
of Nonprofit Enterprise]. 
 9. See Victor Fleisher, Response, “For Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231, 231–32 (2008) [hereinafter For Profit Charity]. 
 10. See, e.g., id.  
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charity more precisely, which would stifle experimentation by nonprofits;11 
(3) profit-making motives would prompt managers and entrepreneurs to 
sacrifice quality in order to retain a profit, which could go largely unnoticed 
because of “contract failure”;12 (4) people would engage in tax avoidance 
and arbitrage, and as a result, the tax base would be eroded;13 and (5) an 
increase in for-profit philanthropy would weaken the public perception that 
charities are altruistic, which would inhibit the growth and success of the 
charitable sector.14 
These critiques are primarily focused on the issue of charitable 
deduction.15 They consider how the ability of an individual to deduct a 
donation to a for-profit entity from their taxable income would affect the 
nonprofit sector and the tax base. Conversely, this note will focus on the 
extension of income tax exemption to for-profit organizations engaged in 
charitable work. It will analyze and critique the extension of tax exemption 
to three categories of charitable work done by for-profit organizations. 
These three categories of for-profit charitable endeavors include: (1) the 
hybrid organization that is vested with a social mission and a market 
philosophy;16 (2) the commercial service provider of public goods;17 and (3) 
the corporation that practices corporate social responsibility.18 Malani and 
Posner’s proposal would extend tax benefits to each type of for-profit 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, 
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX. L. REV. 221, 254–55 (2009). 
 12. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Response, Decoupling?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 235, 240–41 
(2008). “Contract failure” is a term coined by Henry Hansmann. Hansmann theorized that one 
problem faced by donors and consumers of charitable organizations is consumers’ inability to 
measure the quality of the goods or services purchased. This problem is generally created by the 
nature of the service, or the disconnection between the purchaser and the beneficiary. Hansmann 
believes that by ensuring that organizations do not distribute profits, consumers and donors will 
more readily invest in these goods and services. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 
8, at 844–47; see also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role 
of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 519–21 (2010) [hereinafter Theorizing the 
Charitable Tax Subsidies]. 
 13. See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horowitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2010) [hereinafter The Attack on 
Nonprofit Status]. 
 14. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1213–14 (2010). 
 15. See supra notes 11–15. 
 16. See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 337, 339 (2009) [hereinafter Law and Choice of Entity]. 
 17. Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism to Consider 
the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 759 (2009/2010). 
 18. See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social 
Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 856–57 (2008). Kerr formulates a 
spectrum of corporate social responsibility. One of the categories on this spectrum, “Compliance-
Plus,” encapsulates the sort of activity that this note ascribes to the term “corporate social 
responsibility.” Id. Kerr describes these businesses as those that “abide by current laws relating to 
social welfare--labor practices, environmental policies, anticorruption measures, and the like--but 
go beyond mere compliance to integrate socially responsible practices into the model.” Id. at 857 
(footnote omitted).  
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organization. Their reasoning, however, does not account for the disparate 
effects that would result from extending the same tax benefits to these 
organizations.19 They take a utilitarian approach; they believe that by 
rewarding the desired work—as opposed to the organization’s mission—the 
organization’s output of public goods and efficiency will increase.20 
Malani and Posner argue that just as nonprofit firms are taxed for 
business activities that are not “substantially related” to an organization’s 
charitable purpose, under the unrelated business income tax (UBIT), for-
profit firms should not be taxed for the charitable work that they do.21 
Malani and Posner then claim that just as the UBIT was enacted to prevent 
tax discrimination against for-profit organizations competing with nonprofit 
organizations, a policy should be crafted to prevent discrimination against 
for-profits engaging in charitable work.22 Although Malani and Posner do 
not expand on this analogy,23 one can envision a tax policy that would 
operate similarly to the UBIT in order to exempt the charitable work of for-
profit organizations. 
This policy would allow organizations to retain their nonprofit or for-
profit status, while simultaneously rewarding organizations for their 
production of public goods. Just as the UBIT aims to prevent unfair 
competition between for-profit and nonprofit organizations that are 
engaging in the same trade or business,24 this sort of mechanism would 
theoretically increase fairness. On the other hand, this policy has the 
potential to create the types of unfairness against which the UBIT was 
created to protect.25 
Despite the difficulty presented by this potential unfairness, the UBIT 
provides a useful model for a tax policy that would exempt the charitable 
activities of for-profit organizations. The creation of this model will help 
distinguish those types of activities that are worthy of exemption. In 
addition, this model will clarify the extent to which charity law must protect 
against the collapse of the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. The application of this model to the three types of for-profit 
charities discussed above will illustrate the impracticability of this 
generalized utilitarian approach. Finally, it will provide a basis from which 
to discuss alternative reforms. 
This note will argue that the line drawing required to create a tax policy 
that exempts community-benefit activities would undermine Malani and 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See generally Malani & Posner, supra note 1.  
 20. Id. at 2022–23.  
 21. Id. at 2061.  
 22. Id. at 2023.  
 23. Id.  
 24. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 38–39 (Comm. Print. 2005) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. REPORT]. 
 25. Id. at 5.  
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Posner’s goals of increased production of public goods and efficiency.26 
The externalities created by the application of this type of policy would 
outweigh the logical benefits. In addition to the adverse effect of this policy 
on the nonprofit sector,27 the overall production of public goods would be 
diminished by the increase in the administrative costs to the government28 
and the potential loss of tax revenue. 
Part I will discuss the three categories of for-profit organizations doing 
charitable work. Part II will provide background information on the UBIT, 
including a brief synopsis of its history and the rationale behind its creation. 
Part III will use the UBIT as a model for a tax policy aimed at exempting 
community-benefit activities carried out by for-profit organizations. Part IV 
will apply this policy to the various types of for-profit charities, and reveal 
the disutility of the policy. Part V will analyze the costs and the benefits of 
the application of this model. This analysis will argue that the wholesale 
extension of tax exemption to for-profit charities would undermine Malani 
and Posner’s goal of increasing public goods. It reasons that (1) this broad 
sweeping policy would erode the tax base and thus limit the ability of the 
government to provide social services; and (2) the policy is inefficient 
because large corporations are not likely to change their behavior based on 
the money saved through tax relief, whereas, small socially driven for-
profits and nonprofits would be able to reinvest and expand their charitable 
pursuits with the money saved.29 Part VI will discuss an alternative to the 
wholesale extension of tax exemption.  
I. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOR-PROFIT 
PHILANTHROPY 
For-profit charities can be understood as falling into one of three 
categories30: (1) hybrid organizations,31 which are for-profit entrepreneurial 
organizations created for a socially beneficial purpose;32 (2) for-profit 
service providers with nonprofit counterparts,33 such as hospitals, day-care 
centers, and after-school programs;34 and (3) for-profit companies that 
practice corporate social responsibility (CSR).35 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2022.  
 27. See supra text accompanying notes 11,14. 
 28. See For Profit Charity, supra note 9.  
 29. See infra Part V. 
 30. Although there are other ways of categorizing these organizations, for the sake of clarity, 
this note uses these three categories. 
 31. Hybrid organizations come in a number of forms, and scholars refer to them in a variety of 
ways. Some states have created separate corporate forms under which these organizations may be 
incorporated. Taylor, supra note 17, at 759. These variations will not be discussed in this note 
because they do not affect the analysis. 
 32. See Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 16, at 340.  
 33. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 868–69.  
 34. See id. at 865–68.  
 35. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2448.  
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A. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS 
Hybrid organizations are defined by their synthesis of the market 
principles of business organizations and the charitable aims typical of 
nonprofit organizations.36 The allure of these organizations is that they are 
free to invest in the market and are able to distribute profits to managers and 
investors while simultaneously adopting a charitable mission.37 Unlike for-
profit corporations that are driven by the concept of shareholder primacy—
considering activities benefitting the community as a secondary means of 
driving profit—hybrid organizations are created for the purpose of doing 
good.38 
These organizations take on many forms, ranging from microfinance 
investment firms39 to retailers.40 For example, Toms Shoes (Toms) is a large 
shoe production and retail company that donates one pair of shoes to a child 
living in poverty and in need of footwear for each pair of shoes sold.41 
Google.org might also be viewed as a hybrid organization; however, it 
is substantially different from other types of social enterprises.42 Google.org 
is a for-profit entity that is funded by its parent company, Google, Inc.43 
Although Google.org has retained for-profit status in order to avoid the 
restrictions placed on nonprofit organizations, its primary concern is not 
turning a profit.44 In fact, “Google.org views profit as a distant and unlikely 
possible consequence of its activities.”45 
These examples illustrate the varying degrees of emphasis that hybrid 
organizations place on profit making. Whereas retailers who are largely 
concerned with generating a profit may make incidental contributions to 
public welfare, others like Google.org explicitly disregard profit as a 
primary motive.46 Although most hybrid organizations are community 
oriented and display relative indifference towards profits, the potential for 
exploitation of this model warns against extending tax benefits to hybrid 
organizations.47 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Law and Choice of Entity, supra note 16, at 337.  
 37. See id. at 352–55 (explaining that social entrepreneurs are often driven to adopt the for-
profit form because it allows them to raise capital in ways that the nonprofit form prohibits, but 
acknowledging that raising capital is not an easy task for hybrid organizations).  
 38. See id. at 351.  
 39. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2450 (describing microfinance as “social 
enterprise”).  
 40. See, e.g., One for One Movement, TOMS SHOES, http://www.toms.com/our-movement/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 41. Id.  
 42. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2446–52 (describing the ways in which Google.org 
differs from all existing forms of for-profit philanthropy).  
 43. See Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without 
Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 87 (2008). 
 44. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2452.  
 45. Id.  
 46. See Taylor, supra note 17, at 756–58.  
 47. See For Profit Charity, supra note 9, at 232.  
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B. FOR-PROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS 
For-profit service providers are organizations that retain profits for the 
sale of services commonly produced by nonprofit organizations.48 Most 
often, this category is comprised of organizations that are commercial in 
nature but provide social services that produce positive externalities or 
public goods.49 A public good is a service or good purchased by an 
individual or a group but enjoyed by the entire community.50 Once 
purchased, the purchaser cannot exclude others in the community from 
reaping the benefits of these goods.51 For example, healthcare might be 
considered a public good that is provided by for-profit, nonprofit, and 
government institutions.52 Generally, the price of the care is similar across 
providers, and the quality is comparable.53 
Therefore, the question of how to tax these for-profit organizations has 
vexed legal scholars for years.54 Malani and Posner suggest that for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations should be taxed in exactly the same way, 
despite their differences.55 This is problematic, however, because it would 
disincentivize the adoption of the nonprofit form.56 It is important that 
nonprofit organizations remain active in these industries because they 
provide quality control since nonprofits are primarily concerned with 
serving their constituencies rather than increasing profits.57 This mission-
driven approach decreases the possibility that nonprofits will cut corners on 
quality in order to increase profits.58 Quality control is particularly 
important in these industries because of the potential for contract failure.59 
If nonprofits are eliminated from sectors like education, childcare, and 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 868–69.  
 49. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1204.  
 50. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 848.  
 51. See id.  
 52. See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics 
of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003). 
 53. See id. at 1352. “[G]eneral hospitals of all corporate forms are very much alike. They 
operate under the same healthcare regulations, provide inpatient medical care, compete against 
each other for patients and doctors, derive funding from many of the same sources, and serve 
seemingly comparable social functions.” Id. (footnote omitted). Horwitz goes on to unpack this 
notion; she examines the empirical differences in the delivery of certain medical services across 
the corporate forms and comes to the conclusion that the not-for-profit corporate form is 
preferable in this industry. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1346; see also The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1204 (discussing 
examples of alternative proposals).  
 55. Malani & Posner, supra note 1, at 2064–67.  
 56. Cf. The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1199 (providing data to support the 
assertion that there is a great deal of competition among nonprofits and between nonprofits and 
for-profits in industries like healthcare). It stands to reason that if tax benefits were extended to the 
for-profits in these industries, nonprofits would lose the incentive to maintain a nonprofit form. Id.  
 57. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1205–06.  
 58. See id. at 1202–03.  
 59. See The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 8, at 848–49; see also Schizer, supra note 
13. 
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healthcare, the quality of the services would be more difficult to ensure and 
would likely decline.60 
C. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
CSR can be understood in a variety of ways; however, it generally 
connotes a company’s dedication to regulatory compliance and ethical 
practices, and often implies that a corporation engages in activity that 
advances the interests of the community in which it operates.61 This activity 
can take the form of company-wide community service outings, 
partnerships with nonprofit organizations, financial outreach to local 
communities, or the production of socially conscious products.62 CSR has 
become essentially a requirement for large companies.63 Over the past few 
decades, as the public has grown more aware of the environmental and 
societal impact of manufacturing practices, companies have increasingly 
infused their products and brands with socially conscious messages.64 
Examples of these practices are everywhere. For instance, Target, Inc. 
(Target) commits 5 percent of its income to various forms of community 
outreach.65 One example of Target’s community outreach program is its 
literacy initiative, which provides needy schools with books, supports 
literacy organizations, and makes grants to community literacy programs.66 
Starbucks, Inc. (Starbucks) takes its social responsibility a step further;67 
although Starbucks is not a social enterprise willing to sacrifice profit for 
the greater good, its mission is imbued with social consciousness. Chief 
among Starbucks’ goals is to sell exclusively ethically sourced coffee, much 
of which is Fair Trade Certified.68 
Assessing these activities raises important considerations, including (1) 
whether it is economically efficient to exempt these organizations’ 
charitable activities if the tax break has a relatively minor impact on the 
corporations’ ability to benefit their communities but a significant adverse 
effect on the tax base; and (2) whether the potential exemption of these 
activities should apply to income generated from the sale of socially 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See The Attack on Nonprofit Status, supra note 13, at 1201, 1203–05.  
 61. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 857; see also Taylor, supra note 17, at 745, 747–48.  
 62. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 5, at 2449.  
 63. See id. at 2448.  
 64. See id. at 2448–49.  
 65. TARGET, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://sites 
.target.com/images/corporate/about/responsibility_report/2009/2009_full_report.pdf [hereinafter 
TARGET CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY].  
 66. Id. at 5–6. 
 67. STARBUCKS, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: GOALS & PROGRESS 2010, available at 
http://assets.starbucks.com/assets/goals-progress-report-2010.pdf [hereinafter Starbucks Global 
Responsibility]. 
 68. Id.  
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responsible products, such as Starbucks coffee, or whether it should be 
limited to income generated from more traditional charitable activities. 
II. THE UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX 
The UBIT imposes a tax on 501(c)(3) organizations for revenue 
generated by activity that is: (1) “a trade or business”; (2) “regularly carried 
on”; and (3) “not substantially related to . . . [the] exempt purpose” of the 
organization.69 Even if the profits generated by this type of activity are used 
in furtherance of exempt programs, the income will be taxed.70 In other 
words, the activity itself must further the exempt purpose in order for the 
income generated by the activity to be exempt from tax.71 
In determining whether the activity is substantially related to the 
exempt purpose, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers “the size and 
extent of the activit[y] . . . in relation to the nature and extent of the exempt 
function that . . . [the organization] intend[s] to serve.”72 For example, if an 
art program for learning disabled children sells pottery made by the kids, 
the income generated by the sale of that artwork would not be subject to tax 
under the UBIT.73 If, however, the teachers at the school sold their artwork 
as a means of generating revenue for the school, this income might be 
taxed.74 
The UBIT is a relatively recent innovation.75 Before World War II, little 
attention was paid to how exempt organizations generated funds; rather, the 
focus was on how the funds were being used.76 Although tax-exempt 
organizations were required to operate in furtherance of an exempt purpose, 
they could effectuate that purpose in any number of ways, including the 
operation of a profit-making business.77 This standard was dubbed the 
“destination of income” test.78 The Supreme Court codified this test in 
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden.79 There, the Court found that the income of a 
religious organization that generated its profits from the sale and lease of 
land in the Philippines was not taxable because it was used in furtherance of 
its exempt purpose.80  
                                                                                                                 
 69. I.R.S. Pub., Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, Pub. 598 at 3 
(Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf [hereinafter Pub. 598]; see 
also I.R.C. §§ 511–513 (2010). 
 70. Pub. 598, supra note 69, at 3.  
 71. Sean P. Scally, To Pay or Not to Pay, 37 TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (Oct. 2001). 
 72. Pub. 598, supra note 69, at 3.  
 73. See id.  
 74. See id.  
 75. See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political 
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479 (2005). 
 76. See id.  
 77. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 100.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924). 
 80. Id.  
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This issue came to a head in the 1940s when Congress observed an 
uptick in the formation of exempt organizations that were operating as 
businesses in direct competition with tax-paying corporations.81 These 
businesses, termed “feeder” organizations,82 were avoiding taxes by 
devoting their profits to charity.83 For instance, the Second Circuit found 
that an organization operating a private beach was tax-exempt because its 
income was designated for charity.84  
The use of a for-profit business as a source of revenue for New York 
University highlighted the rising concerns over the proliferation of “feeder” 
organizations, and their adverse effects on tax-paying organizations and the 
income tax base alike.85 In 1947, a macaroni company began distributing all 
of its previously taxable income to New York University School of Law.86 
This practice was challenged on the grounds that the macaroni company 
was not operating for an exempt purpose.87 The court held that the pasta 
company was tax-exempt because all of its revenue was devoted to a 
charitable purpose.88 
In response to the growing use of this practice, Congress enacted the 
UBIT as part of the Revenue Act of 1950.89 The tax was primarily 
implemented to prevent unfair competition against for-profit organizations 
operating businesses similar to “feeder” organizations.90 The tax affected all 
charitable organizations other than religious organizations,91 but it did not 
tax passive investment income.92 
Congress modified the UBIT in 1969.93 Chief among the modifications 
were the extension of the UBIT to all organizations, other than U.S. 
instrumentalities exempted by §§ 501(c) and 401(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code;94 the expansion of tax liability for debt-financed income derived in 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Stone, supra note 75, at 1479.  
 82. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101. “Feeder” organizations are for-profit 
companies created as a source of income for tax-exempt organizations. Id.  
 83. See Jessica Peña & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for 
Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1855, 1866 (2001). 
 84. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101; see also Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96 
F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1938). 
 85. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1483.  
 86. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120, 120–21 (3d Cir. 1951); see also Stone, 
supra note 75, at 1483.  
 87. C.F. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 121.  
 88. See id. at 122–23; see also JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 101.  
 89. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1487.  
 90. See id. at 1487–88.  
 91. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 102.  
 92. Id.  
 93. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1487.  
 94. See JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL 
REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 4 
(Comm. Print. 1970) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT]; see also I.R.C. 
§§ 401(a), 501(c) (2010).  
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leaseback deals between tax-exempt organizations and corporations;95 and 
various provisions aimed at limiting the use of taxable controlled 
subsidiaries by tax-exempt organizations to avoid income tax.96 
Since the 1969 reforms, Congress has carved out certain exceptions to 
the UBIT rules.97 For example, entities are not taxed on income generated 
by an exempt organization that gives away low-valued items for the 
purpose of fundraising, or income generated by renting out donor mailing 
lists.98 Furthermore, fundraising activities, such as charity auctions and 
galas, are not taxed even if they are themselves not charitable, so long as 
such activities raise funds for charitable purposes.99 
Congress submits that the passage of the original UBIT and the 
subsequent reforms were, for the most part, motivated by the need to 
prevent unfair competition and tax-base erosion.100 The most popular 
rationale for the UBIT is that it prevents unfair competition. This unfair 
competition comes in two forms: “predatory pricing”101 and the ability of 
nonprofits to expand their market share by reinvesting otherwise taxable 
income into their commercial businesses.102 
One critique of this rationale is that it is simply unfounded.103 If 
organizations operate commercial businesses to capture a financial 
premium, then they have little incentive to cut prices or expand their market 
shares because they want to use the money captured through exemption to 
reinvest in their charitable pursuits.104 In fact, the tendency for nonprofits to 
invest income generated by their commercial pursuits in their charitable 
activities has been supported by qualitative and quantitative research on the 
subject.105 
                                                                                                                 
 95. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103–04; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
REFORM ACT, supra note 94, at 4.  
 96. JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 24, at 103–04.  
 97. Id. at 104.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 105.  
 100. See Stone, supra note 75, at 1488–92; but see id. at 1492–94 (explaining that there are 
alternative explanations for the enactment of the UBIT that are ignored by the government). 
 101. “Predatory pricing” refers to the ability of nonprofit organizations to offer lower prices 
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advantages. See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. 
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Even if one accepts that the concern of unfair competition is legitimate, 
many critics believe the UBIT is ineffective at solving this problem.106 First, 
the UBIT does not explicitly require that all nonprofit business activities 
that are similar to for-profit activities be taxed. Nonprofits can easily 
integrate their mission into these commercial activities, rendering them 
related to the exempt purpose.107 
Second, the self-reporting system, used to enforce the UBIT, presents 
opportunities for nonprofits to evade the UBIT.108 Tax-exempt 
organizations have a great deal of discretion in determining which income-
generating activities are taxable under the UBIT.109 Not only are the 
requirements subject to interpretation by the organizations, but 
organizations may also allocate costs of an exempt activity to an unrelated 
activity in order to diminish the reported net income.110 Although the IRS 
may investigate to ensure that the reporting is accurate, it is not always easy 
to verify the nature of the activity.111 Furthermore, exempt organizations 
have every incentive to avoid reporting unrelated business activity because 
evidence of too much of this activity has the potential to threaten an 
organization’s 501(c)(3) status.112 
The other rationale offered by Congress for the creation of the UBIT 
was that it would prevent tax-base erosion.113 This rationale is also subject 
to question.114 The UBIT standard is malleable enough, that with good tax 
planning, the tax revenue generated by the UBIT is not sufficient to justify 
its existence.115 Furthermore, other rules restricting nonprofit commercial 
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activity are more effective at preventing tax-base erosion and unfair 
competition.116 
Since the creation of the UBIT, these arguments have been subject to 
debate. Advocates of the UBIT feel that it is ill defined and inadequately 
enforced.117 Meanwhile, critics believe that the UBIT is altogether 
unnecessary because it does not achieve its purported goals.118 Despite these 
criticisms and proposals for reform, however, the government continues to 
uphold the UBIT. For better or for worse, the UBIT is here to stay. The 
government has maintained its dedication to balancing the interests of the 
charitable sector and the fairness of the market. 
III. THE UBIT AS A MODEL FOR A TARGETED TAX-
EXEMPTION POLICY 
Malani and Posner argue that the UBIT was established “to eliminate 
tax discrimination against for-profits competing against nonprofits in non-
community-benefit markets.”119 Although the effectiveness of the UBIT at 
achieving fairness has been questioned,120 the UBIT nevertheless provides a 
useful framework from which to fashion a policy that affords for-profit 
organizations tax benefits. Under this model, a for-profit organization could 
file for income tax exemption for income derived from a “trade or business” 
that is “regularly carried on” and “substantially related to an exempt 
purpose.” Like the UBIT, this policy would require corporations to 
determine which activities fall into this category through a self-reporting 
system121 and would require the IRS to be responsible for investigating 
potential wrongdoing.122 
While Malani and Posner did not directly envision the use of a UBIT-
like policy, their rhetorical analogy123 provides perhaps the most useful 
policy proposal. The UBIT serves as a useful model for two reasons: (1) it 
shares Malani and Posner’s goal of achieving a fair result; and (2) it is a 
policy aimed at activity as opposed to organizational form. The application 
and interpretation of the UBIT serve as helpful predictors of how the 
proposal would operate and how its application would vary based on the 
type of organization at issue. Furthermore, the criticism of the UBIT is 
useful in analyzing the utility of this proposal and others like it. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE TARGETED TAX-EXEMPTION 
PROPOSAL 
The application of the policy outlined above to each of the three types 
of for-profits will reveal the tensions that underlie this debate and the 
disutility of applying a uniform policy to all for-profit organizations. 
Furthermore, it will illustrate the impossibility of conditioning tax 
exemption solely on the production of public good. 
A. HYBRID SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
As discussed above, hybrid organizations bear a strong resemblance to 
entrepreneurial nonprofits.124 The only meaningful differences between 
nonprofits and these for-profit entities are their abilities to invest in equity, 
distribute profits, and engage in political lobbying.125 Furthermore, although 
hybrid organizations enjoy the flexibility of managing their profits as they 
see fit, these organizations are rarely motivated by significant financial 
gain.126 
The similarity between nonprofit and for-profit social enterprises makes 
the application of this policy to these hybrid organizations relatively 
simple.127 Take, for example, Toms. On its face, this company looks like 
any other shoe manufacturer. It manufactures a unique style of shoes and 
sells them in stores all over the country.128 However, for each pair of shoes 
sold, the company donates a pair to a child in need living in a developing 
country.129 Toms also partners with healthcare providers and educational 
organizations already working in the targeted communities.130 These 
organizations give away the shoes and provide the children with the 
education and healthcare they need.131 
Although Toms was founded with the mission of accomplishing an 
exempt purpose,132 Toms’ activities would not be exempt under this policy. 
The first two requirements are easily met. Toms generates its income 
through the sale of shoes, which is a “regularly carried on” business by a 
nonexempt organization. It is unclear, however, whether the activity itself, 
the sale of shoes, is “substantially related” to Toms’ exempt purpose. One 
could argue that selling the shoes promotes the buyer’s understanding of the 
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struggles of underprivileged communities.133 The sale of these shoes could 
also be viewed as “defending human . . . rights.”134 These arguments, 
however, are somewhat attenuated. 
Realistically, Toms is similar to the pasta factory distributing income to 
New York University School of Law. Just like the pasta factory, Toms is 
operating a traditional profit-making business so that it can fund its 
charitable activities.135 Although this business is worthy of tax exemption in 
the sense that its work is laudable, this is precisely the type of business that 
the UBIT was created to tax.136 It is, for lack of a better term, a “feeder” 
organization.137 While the typical “feeder” organization has no substantive 
relationship to the charity for which it operates (there is no substantive 
relationship between pasta and law school),138 the fact that Toms sells shoes 
and gives away shoes as part of its charitable mission does not set it apart 
from other types of “feeder” organizations.139 
Other types of social enterprises, however, might qualify for tax 
exemption because the nature of their income-generating activity is 
substantially related to an exempt purpose. Consider, for example, a 
business that trains and employs indigent teenagers. The work done by the 
teens generates the income but is substantially related to multiple exempt 
purposes, such as aiding the poor, promoting education, and preventing 
community deterioration.140 Under the targeted tax-exemption policy, the 
income generated by the work of the teens would be exempt, and income 
derived from other activities carried on by the organization would not. 
While the second example illustrates the potential strength of this 
policy, there is something troubling about the disparate impact that the 
policy would have on these two organizations. Both organizations are 
designed to serve underprivileged children,141 and both put their social 
missions before their financial bottom line.142 These two organizations 
should not be treated differently, but, under this policy, they would be. In 
order to remedy this problem, the requirement that the activity be 
“substantially related” to the exempt purpose would have to be read very 
broadly. It would have to be read so broadly that it might undermine the 
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purpose of the UBIT,143 and inadvertently allow for the exemption of 
income generated by organizations that are far less committed to public 
good. 
B. FOR-PROFIT SERVICE PROVIDERS 
The application of the targeted tax-exemption policy to for-profit 
service providers presents an entirely different problem. As discussed 
above, for-profit service providers operate businesses that are nearly 
identical to their nonprofit counterparts.144 For example, for-profit hospitals 
offer the same services as nonprofit hospitals at similar prices.145 Thus, if 
the targeted tax-exemption policy were applied to a for-profit hospital, 
nearly all of its income would be exempt. The business is “regularly carried 
on,” and the income generating activity is “substantially related to an 
exempt purpose.” The same could be said of for-profit day-care centers or 
for-profit theaters.146 
The extension of tax benefits to these for-profits would effectively 
eliminate the incentive for a service provider of this kind to form as a 
nonprofit.147 This is worrisome because these types of services suffer from 
“contract failure”; the nature of the services makes it nearly impossible for 
the consumers to measure their quality.148 For example, nursing home 
patients are often too sick or unaware of their circumstances to measure the 
quality of their care or to advocate for themselves if their care is lacking.149 
Moreover, this care is often paid for by a patient’s family or medical 
insurance provider, which further limits the nursing home’s accountability 
to the patient.150 Therefore, the consumer of this care must be able to trust 
the provider to ensure quality.151 Similarly, parents are unable to fully 
evaluate the quality of their child’s day-care center.152 There are basic 
measures of course, like safety, which are easy to ascertain. Optimal 
stimulation or social interaction, however, is much more difficult to 
measure.153 
Henry Hansmann believes that nonprofits are more trustworthy in these 
sectors than their for-profit counterparts because they have no reason to cut 
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costs for quality or shirk on promises.154 As a result, the presence of 
nonprofits in these markets prevents for-profits organizations from taking 
advantage of unsuspecting consumers.155 An increase in for-profit presence 
in these sectors would drive out the nonprofit quality controllers.156 
In order to exempt a for-profit service provider’s income without 
reaching the result outlined above, the policy would have to place limits on 
the destination of the income. This is clearly an undesirable result since the 
purpose of creating a policy like this is to provide tax benefits to for-profit 
organizations without forcing them to comply with the nondistribution 
constraint. 
C. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Finally, the application of the targeted tax-exemption policy to CSR 
might be the most workable, and yet, the most problematic application. 
Unlike social enterprise that suffers from under-inclusion, or the for-profit 
service provider that would subsume its nonprofit counterparts, 
corporations practicing CSR would be well served by the policy, without 
adversely affecting nonprofits. Exempting CSR activities, however, is more 
likely to severely erode the tax base. 
For example, Starbucks, which sells predominately ethically sourced 
coffee products,157 would likely be exempt under this policy. The sale of 
ethically sourced coffee is a business that is “regularly carried on” and that 
is “substantially related” to an exempt purpose—“defending human . . . 
rights.”158 Starbucks designed a set of guidelines to which it holds itself 
accountable called Coffee and Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E.) Practices. 
According to Scientific Certification Systems, an independent certification 
organization that verifies “environmental, sustainability, stewardship, food 
quality, food safety and food purity claims” made by product 
manufactures,159 Starbucks, 
initiated C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmer Equity) Practices to evaluate, 
recognize, and reward producers of high-quality sustainably grown coffee. 
C.A.F.E. Practices is a green coffee sourcing guideline developed in 
collaboration with Scientific Certification Systems (SCS), a third-party 
evaluation and certification firm. C.A.F.E. Practices seeks to ensure that 
Starbucks sources sustainably grown and processed coffee by evaluating 
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the economic, social and environmental aspects of coffee production 
against a defined set of criteria, as detailed in the C.A.F.E. Practices 
Guidelines. Starbucks defines sustainability as an economically viable 
model that addresses the social and environmental needs of all the 
participants in the supply chain from farmer to consumer.160 
As this suggests, Starbucks’ business is substantially related to more 
than one exempt purpose.161 By selling ethically sourced coffee, Starbucks 
benefits poor communities, protects children, and generally seeks to secure 
human rights.162 Therefore, all of the income generated by the sale of 
Starbucks coffee would be exempt.  
Like Starbucks, many large companies are incorporating 
environmentally efficient and socially conscious products into their product 
lines.163 These companies would likely be tax-exempt under this targeted 
tax-exemption policy. The sale of these products is not as effective as direct 
financial and in-kind contributions to the underlying movements that these 
companies seek to benefit.164 In most instances, however, the sale of 
environmentally and socially conscious goods is the most efficient way for 
corporations to participate in social movements because they are limited by 
their obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.165 
At first glance, this is an appealing policy because it would incentivize 
more of this behavior by big companies; however, this sort of policy could 
open the floodgates to substantial tax-base erosion.166 Moreover, the 
potential decrease in tax revenue would result in a net loss of public good 
because it would stymie government efforts to provide social services, 
conduct research, and stimulate the economy.167 Furthermore, unlike tax-
exempt nonprofits that lessen the burden on the government by providing 
aid to communities where the government otherwise would, corporations 
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practicing CSR generally have a more incidental impact on the 
community.168 Many theorists do not consider nonprofit tax exemption to 
have an adverse impact on the tax base because nonprofits provide the 
public goods that the government would otherwise have to fund.169 
Assuming that this theory is accurate, the effect of nonprofits on the tax 
base is neutral; a dollar lost in tax revenue is a dollar saved by the 
government.170 Exempting CSR activities, however, would create a net loss 
in public goods.171 
The adverse effect of this trend on tax revenue would undermine the 
purpose of Malani and Posner’s proposal;172 it would decrease the overall 
production of pure public goods, and increase the production of goods and 
services with a tangential or indirect benefit to the community.173 
V. THE INEQUITY IN EQUAL TREATMENT 
The application of this policy illustrates the potential benefits and 
detriments of Malani and Posner’s proposal. There would likely be an 
increase in charitable activity if this policy were enacted. In some instances, 
this activity even has the potential to be more efficient than charitable 
activity carried out by nonprofits.174  
Nevertheless, the flaws of the UBIT standards, which scholars have 
critiqued for decades,175 are the source of many of the problems associated 
with the targeted tax-exemption policy outlined above. Just as others have 
observed through the application of the UBIT, the prongs of the test are 
malleable, and therefore, difficult to apply.176 The vagueness of the 
prongs177 is particularly problematic when the policy is applied to for-
profits. The application of this policy illustrates the potential for arbitrary 
and unfair results. These arbitrary results would undermine Malani and 
Posner’s goals of efficiency and fairness.178 
Moreover, unlike the UBIT, which attempts to curb tax-base erosion,179 
this policy would cause severe harm to the tax base. Consequently, this note 
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argues that basing tax exemption solely on activity, as opposed to a 
combination of activity and the organizational form, is bad public policy. 
Furthermore, it argues that implementing a one-size-fits-all policy to deal 
with inequities in the market is illogical.180 
A. THE STANDARD IS FLAWED 
The first two requirements—that the activity be a “business or trade” 
and that it be “regularly carried on”—are problematic standards despite the 
fact that they are relatively simple.181 In the UBIT context, the term “trade 
or business” is understood to characterize activities that generate profits and 
are commercial in nature.182 This is problematic in the context of this 
hypothetical policy because some of the most valuable charity work carried 
out by for-profit organizations does not generate a profit. Therefore, the test 
is under-inclusive. For instance, a number of large corporations, such as 
Target and Walmart, have established pro bono programs that provide free 
goods and services to the needy.183 These organizations might be deserving 
of a benefit, but they will not be eligible for any benefits under this policy 
because they do not generate a profit by offering those services;184 the 
activities do not constitute a “trade or business.”185 
Conversely, the “regularly carried on” standard is so vague that it has 
the potential to cause overreporting.186 Under the UBIT, courts tend to 
assess “the frequency and continuity of the activities, the manner in which 
they are conducted, and their similarity to comparable activities of 
nonexempt businesses” in order “to determine whether” the activity is 
“regularly carried on.”187 These factors are helpful, but vague. There is little 
indication of how often or for how long the activity must be carried on.188 
Nor is there a strong indication of how similar an activity must be to the 
activity of its nonexempt counterpart.189 As a result, nonprofits have found 
ways of interpreting this standard in such a way as to underreport these 
activities.190 
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Similarly, the targeted tax-exemption policy could be manipulated so as 
to enable for-profit organizations to overreport these activities. For instance, 
NBC Universal hosts a biannual “green week” on its television channels 
that seeks to integrate the promotion of green practices into much of its 
programming.191 This activity is a “trade or business” and is “substantially 
related to an exempt purpose,” but it is only carried on for two weeks per 
year.192 However, because green week is a nationally recognized annual 
celebration of the green movement, it may qualify as “regularly carried 
on.”193 Furthermore, although the IRS would be empowered to investigate 
potential inaccuracies in organizations’ filings, the cost of doing so might 
be greater than the revenue lost through exemption.194 
The third requirement, that the activity be “substantially related” to an 
exempt purpose, creates an even more troubling dilemma, which strikes at 
the heart of nonprofit law: how should the IRS effectively define an exempt 
or charitable purpose.195 Without the safety valve of the nondistribution 
constraint, the question of what charity law truly seeks to promote is 
exposed.196 What does society value about charity? Although the answer to 
this question is beyond the scope of this note, its importance should not be 
overlooked. 
Currently, exempt purposes are broadly defined as follows:  
The exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c)(3) are charitable, 
religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, 
fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and 
preventing cruelty to children or animals. The term charitable is used in 
its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the 
distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement 
of education or science; erecting or maintaining public buildings, 
monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; lessening 
neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; 
defending human and civil rights secured by law; and combating 
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.197 
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This broad definition is favorable for nonprofit organizations that 
require flexibility in defining their missions.198 It is problematic, however, 
when considering extending tax benefits to for-profit organizations that are 
not subject to the nondistribution constraint.199 As seen above, this 
definition could encompass a broad range of activities, such as the sale of 
green products, which could easily be undertaken without a true charitable 
purpose. Without enforcement mechanisms, capable of divining a 
company’s true purpose200 and monitoring the charitable impact of a 
company’s activities, a policy employing such a broad definition could 
easily be abused.201 For instance, an organization could sell products that 
are made with recyclable materials because it believes that consumers are 
more likely to purchase them, and simultaneously, the company could 
exploit its factory workers. These perverse results highlight the complex 
problems that arise in applying the third prong of this policy. 
The even more difficult aspect of the third prong, however, is how to 
access what is “substantially related” to an exempt purpose. As the 
application of this policy illustrates, the use of the UBIT rubric for this 
prong of the test leads to strange results.202 Under this policy, the income 
generated by Starbucks’ sale of ethically sourced coffee would be exempt 
whereas the income generated by Toms would not.203 Although both 
organizations should be recognized for their social consciousness, one 
could argue that Toms is more charitable, as it targets needy communities 
and provides them with direct aid.204 More importantly, however, it is likely 
that exempting Toms from income tax would have a stronger impact on the 
company’s ability to affect the lives of its beneficiaries than the impact that 
exempting Starbucks’ income would have on its ability to sell ethically 
sourced coffee.205 Furthermore, providing income tax exemption for 
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companies like Starbucks, as opposed to Toms, will have a much more 
severe impact on the tax base.206 
B. THESE FLAWS INHERE TO ANY POLICY THAT EXEMPTS FOR-
PROFIT CHARITY 
Although one could argue that this hypothetical policy is to blame for 
the problems that arise out of its application, it is merely illustrative of the 
inevitable consequences of a broad, sweeping policy that seeks to achieve 
Malani and Posner’s goals.207 The analysis above not only demonstrates the 
practical inefficiency of this policy, but it also highlights the disutility of 
treating all for-profits alike and all charitable activity alike. It is tempting to 
succumb to the logic that like things should be treated alike. But it does 
more harm than good to ignore the differences between the various types of 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations and the manner in which they 
produce public goods.208 
Notably, the benefit retained by hybrid organizations like Toms, as 
opposed to Starbucks, is more likely to have an impact on the 
organization’s charitable mission since hybrids generally have more 
freedom to disregard shareholder primacy.209 That is not to say that hybrid 
organizations refrain from distributing profits; however, whether money 
saved through exemption goes towards employee bonuses or director 
compensation, it will improve the efficiency of the organization, which will 
theoretically increase the overall public good.210 
This illustrates that even the most equitable policy is not a one-size-fits-
all solution to Malani and Posner’s concerns. The government has 
recognized this logic; personal income tax rates are based on an individual’s 
level of income.211 While these tax rates are unequal, the government has 
determined that they are equitable.212 If the rationale behind the UBIT were 
applied to personal income tax rates, all taxpayers would be taxed at the 
same rate regardless of their wealth.213 The government has recognized, 
however, that this is illogical and unfair.214 
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Professor Rob Atkinson uses this analogy to illustrate that the perceived 
lack of fairness remedied by the UBIT is a misconception; he argues that it 
is equitable to treat like for-profit and nonprofit business activity 
differently.215 Although Atkinson’s analogy is meant to illustrate the 
problems with the UBIT,216 it also suggests that the unequal treatment of 
nonprofits and for-profits doing charitable work is equitable.217 
Alternatively, this analogy demonstrates that certain for-profits should be 
treated more like nonprofits than others in order to achieve an equitable 
result.218 
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE WHOLESALE 
EXTENSION OF TAX EXEMPTION  
Malani and Posner’s theory that tax exemption will incentivize existing 
for-profit organizations to engage in “community-benefit” work and prompt 
the formation of more socially conscious for-profit organizations is likely 
accurate. Most studies, however, do not support Malani and Posner’s 
assertions that a for-profit presence in the charitable sector increases 
competition and efficiency.219 The hypothetical policy suggested by this 
note was modeled after the UBIT in order to balance Malani and Posner’s 
goal of increased output with the valid concerns posed by other scholars as 
to the effects of the more aggressive reforms sought by Malani and 
Posner.220 For the reasons discussed above, however, it is clear that even a 
modest policy like this would undermine Malani and Posner’s goals of 
increasing overall public good.221 
One alternative to this policy is a reduced corporate income tax rate for 
charitable business activity. This rate would vary according to the amount 
of charitable activity undertaken by a company. A large for-profit 
corporation, like Starbucks or Target, would have a greater incentive to 
increase CSR, but the reduced rate would have a more proportionate impact 
on the tax base than a wholesale exemption of income generated through 
charitable activity.222 On the other hand, organizations like Toms and 
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Google.org would enjoy a more favorable tax rate.223 This scheme, although 
administratively complicated, would provide tax relief to all organizations 
doing charitable work, and it would prevent the severe tax-base erosion 
envisioned above.224 Furthermore, this conditional tax rate would promote 
equity; the rate of reduction would vary according to the potential impact of 
tax relief on an organization’s ability to provide more public goods to its 
community. 
This idea shares some qualities with tax credit policies that refund a 
percentage of a company’s income tax when it engages in certain types of 
charitable activity, such as renewable energy production.225 Like tax credits, 
this reduced rate scheme would reward charitable activity by reducing a 
company’s income tax expenditure.226 The benefit of the reduced rate 
scheme, however, is that it would apply to any activity that served an 
exempt purpose, as opposed to targeting a handful of activities that serve 
the government’s pet interests.227 Furthermore, this rate reduction would be 
more efficient than a tax credit because it would vary according to the 
benefit that it would confer on the community.228 
CONCLUSION 
This note argues that the policy proposed by Malani and Posner is 
unworkable and inequitable. It draws on Malani and Posner’s analogy to the 
UBIT to explain how a policy based on the UBIT principles undermines 
their laudable goals of increasing the production of public goods and the 
efficiency of the charitable sector. Finally, this note seeks to find an 
alternative approach to reaching these goals. Although the proposal above is 
by no means a perfect solution, it illustrates that a policy which accounts for 
the differences between organizations and their charitable efforts is more 
equitable than Malani and Posner’s one-size-fits-all approach.229 
Kalle Condliffe 
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